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Abstract
I examine GHG emission policy in a world with a fixed number of
regions. In each region, labor and emissions are complementary in
production, total world-wide emissions decrease welfare, and total
factor productivity can be improved by R&D. A subset of regions
can establish an “abatement coalition”, authorizing a central plan-
ner to grant them non-traded or traded GHG permits. The planner
is self-interested, subject to lobbying, and has no budget of its own.
The results are the following. The establishment of the “abatement
coalition” enhances welfare, promotes economic growth and dimin-
ishes emissions both inside and outside the coalition. With technolog-
ical change due to R&D, GHG permit trade decreases welfare. Fur-
thermore, it increases emissions and slows down economic growth, if
emissions are inelastic with respect to the price for permits. Without
technological change, GHG permit trade does not make any difference.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I focus on two issues of emission policy: (i) If some countries
limit their GHG emissions, then how do the other “free-riding” countries re-
spond to this? (ii) How much authority should the former countries delegate
to a central planner that coordinates their actions?
Depending on the structure of the model, there are different results on
free riding in emission policy in the literature. Babiker (2005) uses a multi-
good model of international trade, showing that the escape of dirty industries
from a coalition of abating regions offsets emission reductions achieved within
that coalition. In contrast, Grubb et al. (2002) and Di Maria and van der
Werf (2008) use in a variety-expansion model of growth, showing that local
emission cuts spur GHG-saving innovations, thereby generating emission cuts
elsewhere as well. Copeland and Taylor (2005) demonstrate in a two-good
two-factor model of international trade that the following results hold in
an open trading world, but not in a closed economy setting: (i) unilateral
emission reductions inside an abatement coalition can generate self-interested
emission reductions by the free riders; (ii) emission cuts may be efficient even
when regions trade in GHG permits; and (iii) the occurrence of trade in GHG
permits may increase global emissions, making both participants in the trade
worse off. In contrast to these papers, I construct a one-good quality-ladders
model of trade and growth to examine grandfathering and other relevant
aspects of emission policy.
Bo¨ringer and Lange (2005) derive optimal schemes for the free alloca-
tion of emission allowances in a dynamic context, but with no technological
change. They consider emissions–based allocation rules which allow for up-
dating of the basis of allocation over time.1 They show that in closed trading
systems with an absolute cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which
allocate allowances proportionally to past emissions are first-best. They ex-
plain this result as follows. If the proportionality rule is identical for all
producers, then these will face the same marginal benefits from emissions
via allocation in subsequent periods. The increased demand for allowances,
1Later on, Mackenzie et al. (2008) extend Bo¨hringer and Lange’s (2005) analysis to
a more general design of a dynamic initial allocation mechanism, which allows for the
allocation of permits to be based on each firm’s choices relative to other firms.
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however, cannot lead to an increase in emissions since the total level of emis-
sions is fixed. Therefore, a grandfathering scheme only affects the nominal
allowance price but not production decisions directly. Because the basis for
allocation can be updated over time, the central planner has a full control of
resources.
Jouvet et al. (2008) incorporates externality through pollution in a
dynamic overlapping-generations (OLG) model, showing that the optimal
growth path can be decentralized only with lump-sum transfers and a mar-
ket for GHG permits. Efficiency requires that no grandfathering permits
should be given to firms. All permits should rather be auctioned, which
rules out all grandfathering practises. Jouvet et al. (2008) explain these re-
sults as the follows. Grandfathering practices subsidize firms by raising the
return on investment. This causes a distortion that does not occur when the
rights to pollute are provided to households in a lump-sum manner.
The EU has been willing to act as a leader of international climate policy
(Oberthu¨r 2009; Vogler 2005). However, concerns over the competitiveness of
the EU and the political influence of industry pressure groups have generated
substantial concessions to the emitting sectors, weakening the effectiveness
of the EU’s emission policy (Markussen and Svendsen 2005; Neuhoff et al.
2006). These examples emphasize that it is not realistic to assume the central
planners to be benevolent and independent. In this paper, I assume that the
central planner in a coalition is self-interested and subject to lobbying.
Palokangas (2009) examines the implementation of emission policy with
a self-interested central planner in a quality-ladders model of growth. That
article shows that on fairly general conditions, emission trade speeds up
growth from the initial position of laissez-faire, but slows down from the
initial position of centrally-determined emission quotas. In this paper, I
assume that there are free riders, with different preferences and technology.
I show that a simple grandfathering scheme of granting GHG permits is
Pareto superior to using the traded GNG permits.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents the general struc-
ture of the economy. Section 3 examines free riders, Section 4 strategic
complementarity in emission policy, Section 5 grandfathering and 6 trade in
GHG permits, respectively.
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2 The model
I consider a world with a great number of regions placed evenly within the
limit [0, N ]. All regions possess one labor unit. To simplify the model, I
eliminate (i) the terms-of-trade effect by the assumption that there is only
one good in the world, and (ii) international capital movements in equilibrium
by the assumption that all households in the world share the same constant
rate of time preference, ρ.2 With these assumptions, the regions can grow at
different rates in the stationary state.
Region j ∈ [0, N ] possesses one labor unit and devotes the amount lj of
this to production and the rest
zj = 1− lj (1)
to R&D. It produces the good from labor lj and GHG emissions mj, but
they improve their efficiency through in-house R&D. Emissions in region j,
mj, hurt nobody in that region j, but total emissions in the world,
M =
∫ N
0
mjdj. (2)
hurt everybody in the entire world.
2.1 Households
Because the households in region j are small enough to take the consump-
tion price P , the local interest rate rj and total emissions M , as given, the
consumption and production decisions can be separated. The representa-
tive household in region j (hereafter called household j) chooses its flow of
consumption Cj to maximize its utility starting at time T ,∫ ∞
T
(log Dj)e
−ρ(θ−T )dθ, Dj =M−δjCj, δj > 0, ρ > 0, (3)
where θ is time, Dj = M
−δjCj the composite commodity of consumption
Cj and pollution M , ρ the rate of time preference and δj a parameter. The
higher δj, the more the households in region j dislike pollution.
2Cf. result (5).
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Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from Cj to Dj, the problem
of household j choosing a path for consumption Cj is equivalent to its problem
choosing a path for the quantity of Dj. This leads to the Euler equation (cf.
Grossman and Helpman 1994b)
E˙j
Ej =
dEj
dt
1
Ej = rj − ρ with Ej
.
= PDj = PM
−δjCj, (4)
where Ej is household j’s total expenditure on the composite good Dj, given
total emissions M .
Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal
price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize the households’ total
expenditure on the composite commodity in the economy,
∫ N
0
Ekdk, at unity.
Because the relative expenditures of the regions j, Ej
/∫ N
0
Ekdk, are constants
in the steady state, it follows that dEj/dt = 0 holds true in the steady state.
From (4) it then follows that the interest rate is uniform and constant:
rj = r = ρ > 0 for all j. (5)
2.2 Production
When the markets for goods and labor are perfect in region j, the firms and
households in that region behave as if there were a single revenue-maximizing
agent (hereafter called region j) that possesses all local resources. When
region j develops a new technology, it increases its total factor productivity
(TFP) by constant a > 1. Its TFP is then equal to aγj , where γj is its serial
number of technology. Given TFP, region j is subject to the CES production
function f j(lj,mj), where lj (mj) is the input of labor (emissions). It then
produces consumption good according to Yj = a
γjf j(lj,mj).
I make the plausible assumption that labor and emissions are gross com-
plements, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between them is less than one.
This means that an increase in the relative use of emissions, mj/lj, decreases
the value-added proportion of emissions, ξj:
mjf
j
n(lj,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
=
f jn(lj/mj, 1)
f j(lj/mj, 1)
.
= ξj
( lj
mj
)
, ξ′j > 0,
ljf
j
l (lj,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
= 1− ξj
( lj
mj
)
, f jl
.
=
∂f
∂lj
, f jn
.
=
∂f j
∂mj
. (6)
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Region j produces the composite commodity Dj = CjM
−δj of consumption
Cj and total emissions M according to
yj =M
−δjYj =M−δjaγjf j(lj,mj). (7)
2.3 Research and development (R&D)
The improvement of region j’s technology depends on its labor devoted to
R&D, zj. In a small period of time dt, the probability that R&D leads to
development of a new technology with a jump from γj to γj + 1 is given by
λzjdt, while the probability that R&D remains without success is given by
1− λzjdt, where λ is productivity in R&D. Noting (1), this defines a Poisson
process χj with
dχj =
{
1 with probability λzjdt = λ(1− lj)dt,
0 with probability 1− λzjdt = 1− λ(1− lj)dt, (8)
where dχj is the increment of the process χj. The expected growth rate of
productivity aγj in the production sector in the stationary state is given by
gj
.
= E
[
log aγ+1 − log aγ] = (log a)λzj = (log a)λ(1− lj),
where E is the expectation operator (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 59).
Because the expected growth rate gj of the output of the composite good D
for region j is in fixed proportion to zj, labor devoted to R&D, zj = 1 − lj,
can be used as a proxy of growth in region j.
3 Free riders
Free-riding region j maximizes the expected present value of an infinite
stream of its real income beginning at time T ,
Ωj(γj,m−j, n, T )
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
yje
−r(t−T )dt (9)
by GHG and labor inputs (mj, lj) subject to Poisson technological change
(8), given GHG emissions in the rest of the world,
m−j
.
=M −mj =
∫
k 6=j
mkdk. (10)
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Noting (2), (7), (9) and (10), the value of region j’s optimal program starting
at time T is given by
Ωj(γj,m−j, n, T )
.
= max
(mj , lj) s.t. (8)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf j(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δje−r(t−T )dt.
(11)
I denote the value of region j’s optimal program with current technology
γj by Ω
j = Ωj(γj,m−j, n, T ) and that with future technology γj + 1 by
Ω˜j = Ωj(γj + 1,m−j, n, T ). The Bellman equation corresponding to the
optimal program (11) is then
rΩj = max
mj ,lj
Φj(mj, lj, γj,m−j, n, T ), (12)
where
Φj(mj, lj, γj,m−j, n, T ) = aγjf j(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δj + λ(1− lj)
[
Ω˜j − Ωj].
(13)
This leads to the first-order conditions
∂Φj
∂mj
=
aγjf jm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj
− δja
γjf j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj+1
= 0, (14)
∂Φj
∂lj
=
aγjf jl (lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj
− λ[Ω˜j − Ωj] = 0. (15)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Ωj, is in fixed proportion ϕj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Ωj(γj,m−j, n, T ) = ϕjaγjf j(l∗j ,m
∗
j)(m
∗
j +m−j)
−δj , (16)
where l∗j and m
∗
j are the optimal values of the control variables lj and mj.
This implies
(Ω˜j − Ωj)/Ωj = a− 1. (17)
Inserting (16) and (17) into the Bellman equation (12) and (13) yields
1/ϕj = r + (1− a)λ(1− lj) > 0. (18)
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Inserting (16) and (17) into the first-order conditions (14) and (15) yields
mj
Ωj
∂Φj
∂mj
=
1
ϕj
[
mjf
j
m(lj,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
− δjmj
mj +m−j
]
= 0,
lj
Ωj
∂Φj
∂lj
=
1
ϕj
ljf
j
l (lj,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
− (a− 1)λlj = 0. (19)
Noting (1), (7), (10) and (18), the equilibrium conditions (19) change into
ξj
(
lj
mj
)
.
=
mf jm(l
j,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
=
δjmj
M
∈ (0, 1), (20)
(a− 1)λlj
r + (1− a)λ(1− lj) =
ljf jl (lj,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
= 1− ξj
(
lj
mj
)
= 1− δjmj
M
. (21)
Solving for lj and mj from these equations yields the free riders’ response
functions as follows (cf. Appendix):
zj(M) with z
′
j < 0 and mj(M) with m
′
j > 0 for j ∈ (n,N ],∫ N
n
m′jdj <
1
M
∫ N
n
mjdj < 1. (22)
4 Strategic complementarity
Inserting (10) and (22) into (2) yields M = mj(M) + m−j. Differentiat-
ing this totally and noting (22), one obtains dM/dm−j = 1/(1 − m′j) > 0,
dmj/dm−j = m′j/(1−m′j) > 0 and dzj/dm−j = dzj/(1−m′j) < 0. In other
worlds:
Proposition 1 Emission cuts elsewhere (i.e. a fall in m−j) decrease a free
rider’s emissions, dmj/dm−j > 0, but promote its growth, dzj/dm−j < 0.
In the literature, a number of effects have been proposed to explain this
strategic complementarity of emission policy:
• Income effect. If the environmental quality is a normal good, an in-
crease in the free riders’ real income due to emission policy decreases
emissions (e.g. Copeland and Taylor 2005).
• Induced-technology effect. When technology is allowed to adjust en-
dogenously, induced technological change leads to a reduction emissions
among free riders as well (e.g. Di Maria and Van der Werf 2008).
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• Technology-spillover effect. When improvements in abatement technol-
ogy generated by the emission constraint inside the coalition spill over
to free riders, emissions in the latter fall (Golombek and Hoel 2004;
Gerlach and Kuik 2007).
Proposition 1 provides an alternative explanation of the strategic comple-
mentarity of emission policy as follows: If the rest of the world decreases its
emissions m−j, then, given preferences (3), the marginal disutility of total
emissions in region j, −∂Dj/∂m−j = −∂Dj/∂M = δjM−δj−1Cj, increases.
This compels region j to reduce its emissions mj. Because labor and emis-
sions are complementary in production, labor input in production, lj, falls.
This decreases the wage and promotes labor-intensive R&D. With a higher
level of R&D, economic growth is faster.
5 Grandfathering
I assume that a subset [0, n] of regions [0, N ] establishes a coalition which at-
tempts to regulate GHG (hereafter called the coalition). The central planner
of this coalition sets GHG quotas or non-traded permits on its members, but
has no control over regions j ∈ (n,N ] that remain free riders. The coalition
members j ∈ [0, N ] lobby the central planner over these permits. I assume
that the members of the coalition share the same preferences and technology,
for simplicity:3
δj = δ and f
j(lj,mj) = f(lj,mj) for j ∈ [0, n]. (23)
Grandfathering means that GHG emission permits have a base that is
determined by the history, but updated over time. In the quality-ladders
model of this paper, grandfathering can be specified as follows. The central
planner sets the GHG permits for region j, mj, in fixed proportion ε ∈ [0, 1]
to region j’s emissions under previous technology, m̂j:
4
mj = εm̂j for j ∈ [0, n]. (24)
3If the members were heterogeneous, then there is no unique solution for the menu
auction models in Subsections 5.4 and 6.2.
4That is, when the current number of technology is τj , the allocation base m̂j is calcu-
lated by region j’s emissions under previous technology τj − 1 (cf. Subsection 2.3).
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The proportion ε is the policy variable. When central planner tighten emis-
sion policy by decreasing ε, the rule (24) fixes region j’s GHG input mj.
5.1 Political contributions and real income
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), I assume that the central planner
of the coalition has its own interests and collects political contributions. Re-
gion j pays its contributions Rj to the central planner which decides on a
specific GHG permit mj for this. The order of this common agency game is
the following. First, the regions set their political contributions (R1, ..., Rn)
conditional on the central planner’s prospective policy ε. Second, the cen-
tral planner sets the permits ε and collects the contributions for its personal
consumption. Third, the regions maximize their utilities given the level of
political contributions (R1, ..., Rn). This game is solved in reverse order:
Subsection 5.2 considers regions and 5.4 the political equilibrium.
Region j ∈ [0, n] pays political contributions Rj to the central planner.
I assume, for simplicity, that the central planner consists of civil servants
who inhabit regions j = 1, ..., J evenly. This implies that each region j gets
an equal share 1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk of total contributions. Because the households in
regions j = 1, ..., J consume the same composite commodity D, real political
contributions Rj can be defined in terms of that commodity. Real income in
region j is therefore given by
yj −Rj + 1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk,
where yj is output, Rj contributions paid to the central planner and
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk
the proportion of total contributions repaid to region j. Noting (7), the ex-
pected present value of an infinite stream of real income in region j beginning
at time T is given by
Υj = E
∫ ∞
T
(
yj −Rj + 1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk
)
e−r(t−T )dt
= E
∫ ∞
T
[
M−δjaγjf j(lj, nj)−Rj + 1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk
]
e−r(t−T )dt, (25)
where E is the expectation operator and r > 0 the interest rate [cf. (5)].
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5.2 The members of the coalition
Region j ∈ [0, N ] maximizes its utility (25) by labor input lj subject to
Poisson technological change (8) on the assumption that the interest rate r,
the permits, mk for k ∈ [0, n], total GHG emissions M =
∫ N
0
mkdk [cf. (2)]
and and its political contributions Rj are kept constant. It is equivalent to
maximize
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj,mj)M
−δe−r(t−T )dt
by lj subject to (8), given r,mj,M and Rj. The value of the optimal program
for region j starting at time T can then be defined as follows:
Γj(γj,mj,M, T ) = max
lj s.t. (8)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj,mj)M
−δe−r(t−T )dt. (26)
I denote Γj = Γj(γj,mj,M, T ) and Γ˜
j = Γj(γj + 1,mj,M, T ). The Bell-
man equation corresponding to the optimal program (26) is
rΓj = max
lj
Ψj(lj, γj,mj,M, T ), (27)
where
Ψj(lj, γj,mj,M, T ) = a
γjf(lj,mj)M
−δ + λ(1− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (28)
This leads to the first-order condition
∂Ψj
∂lj
= aγjfl(lj,mj)M
−δ − λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = 0. (29)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γj, is in fixed proportion ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γj(γj,mj,M, T ) = ϑja
γj
f(l∗j ,mj)
M δ
,
∂Γj
∂mj
=
fm(l
∗
j ,mj)
f(l∗j ,mj)
Γj,
∂Γj
∂M
= −δΓ
j
M
,
(30)
where l∗j is the optimal value of the control variable lj. This implies
(Γ˜j − Γj)/Γj = a− 1. (31)
Inserting (30) and (31) into the Bellman equation (27) and (28) yields
1/ϑj = r + (1− a)λ(1− lj) > 0. (32)
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Inserting (30), (31) and (32) into the first-order conditions (29) and noting
(7), one obtains
lj
Γj
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
1
ϑj
ljfl(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− (a− 1)λlj = 1
ϑj
[
1− ξ
( lj
mj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj
=
[
r + (1− a)λ(1− lj)
][
1− ξ
( lj
mj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj = 0. (33)
5.3 Utility
Noting (2) and (22), total emissions M =MN are determined by
M =
∫ n
0
mjdj +
∫ N
n
mj(M)dj.
The equation defines the function
M =MN
(∫ n
0
mjdj
)
,
(MN)′ =
[
1−
∫ N
n
m′k(M)dk
]−1
.
(34)
Noting (2), (7), (24), (26), (30) and (34), region j’s utility (25) becomes
Υj({Rk}, {mk}) = Γj(γj,mj,M, T ) +
∫ ∞
T
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
e−r(t−T )dt
= Γj(γj,mj,M, T ) +
1
r
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
with M =MN
(∫ n
0
mjdj
)
,
∂Υj
∂mj
=
∂Γj
∂mj
+
∂Γj
∂M
(MN)′ = Γj
[
fm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− δ
M
(MN)′
]
= Γj
[
1
mj
ξ
( lj
mj
)
− δ
M
(
1−
∫ N
n
m′kdk
)−1]
,
∂Υj
∂Rj
=
( 1
n
− 1
)1
r
,
∂Υj
∂mk
=
∂Γj
∂M
(MN)′ = −δΓ
j
M
(
1−
∫ N
n
m′kdk
)−1
for k ∈ [0, n] and k 6= j,
(35)
where {Rk} .= {Rk| k ∈ [0, n]} and {mk} .= {mk| k ∈ [0, n]}.
5.4 The political equilibrium
The present value the expected flow of the real political contributions Rj
from all regions j ∈ [0, n] at time T is given by
G({Rk}) .= E
∫ ∞
T
(∫ n
0
Rjdj
)
e−r(θ−T )dθ =
1
r
∫ n
0
Rjdj. (36)
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Because region j tries to affect the central planner by its contributions Rj,
its contribution schedule is a function of the central planner’s policy ε:
Rj(ε), j ∈ [0, N ]. (37)
According to Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules Rj(ε) and a policy
ε such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Rj are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income, Υj ≥ 0.
(ii) The policy ε maximizes the central planner’s welfare (36) taking the
contribution schedules Rj as given,
ε ∈ argmax
ε
G
({Rk(ε)}); (38)
(iii) Region j cannot have a feasible strategy Rj(ε) that yields it a higher
level of utility than in equilibrium, given the central planner’s antici-
pated decision rule,
ε = argmax
ε
Υj({Rk(ε)}, {εm̂k}). (39)
(iv) Region j provides the central planner at least with the level of utility
than in the case it offers nothing (Rj = 0), and the central planner
responds optimally given the other regions contribution functions,
G
({Rk(ε)}) ≥ max
ε
G
({Rk(ε)})∣∣∣
Rj=0
.
Noting (24) and (35), the condition (39) is equivalent to
0 =
∂Υj
∂Rj
dRj
dε
+
∫ n
0
∂Υj
∂mk
∂mk
∂ε
dk =
( 1
n
− 1
)1
r
dRj
dε
+
∫ n
0
∂Υj
∂mk
m̂kdk
for j ∈ [0, n] and
dRj
dε
=
rn
1− n
∫ n
0
∂Υj
∂mk
m̂kdk =
rnΓj
1− n
[
1
mj
ξ
( lj
mj
)
m̂j −
∫ n
0
δ
M
(MN)′m̂kdk
]
=
rnΓj
1− n
[
m̂j
mj
ξ
( lj
mj
)
− δ
M
(
1−
∫ N
n
m′kdk
)−1 ∫ n
0
m̂kdk
]
for j ∈ [0, n].
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Given these equations, one obtains∫ n
0
dRj
dε
dj =
rn
1− n
∫ n
0
Γj
[
m̂j
mj
ξ
( lj
mj
)
− δ
M
(
1−
∫ N
n
m′`d`
)−1 ∫ n
0
m̂kdk
]
dj.
(40)
Noting (37), the central planner’s utility function (36) becomes
G(ε) .= 1
r
∫ n
0
Rj(ε)dj.
Noting this and (40), the equilibrium conditions (38) are equivalent to the
first-order conditions
dG
dε
=
1
r
∫ n
0
dRj
dε
dj
=
n
1− n
∫ n
0
Γj
[
m̂j
mj
ξ
( lj
mj
)
− δ
M
(
1−
∫ N
n
m′`d`
)−1 ∫ n
0
m̂kdk
]
dj = 0.
(41)
Let us consider a stationary state where inputs (lj,mj) are independent
of the number of technology τj for regions j ∈ [0, n]. Because region j’s emis-
sions under the previous technology m̂j must be equal to region j’s emissions
under current technology mj after subsequent changes in technology, it must
be ε = 0 in the stationary state. The political equilibrium is specified by the
equilibrium conditions (33) for all regions j ∈ [0, n] plus that (41) for the
central planner. In this system, there are unknown variables mj and lj for
j ∈ [0, n]. Noting (23), this yields a stationary state with perfect symmetry:
lj = l
N and, m̂j = mj = m
N for j ∈ [0, N ]. (42)
Given this and (9), the equilibrium conditions (33) and (41) change into
ξ
( lN
mN
)
=
[
1−
∫ N
n
m′j(M
N)dj
]−1
δ
nmN
MN
, (43)
(a− 1)λlN
r + (1− a)λ(1− lN) = 1− ξ
( lN
mN
)
.
(44)
5.5 Pareto optimum
If there were a benevolent central planner that would maximize the represen-
tative household’s welfare in the coalition and make inter-regional transfers
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for that purpose, it could entirely internalize the externality though GHG
emissions and the outcome is a Pareto optimum. In that case, the coalition
would behave as if there were a single jurisdiction, n = 1. Noting (42)-(44),
this Pareto optimum (MP , lP ,mP ) is given by
ξ
( lP
mP
)
=
[
1−
∫ N
n
m′j(M
P )dj
]−1
δ
mP
MP
,
(a− 1)λlP
r + (1− a)λ(1− lP ) = 1− ξ
( lP
mM
)
,
(45)
where MP total pollution in the world, lP total labor input in production in
the coalition and mP total emissions in the coalition. Comparing the system
(34)-(44) with the system (45) of three equations yields the following result:
Proposition 2 With grandfathering, the coalition attains its Pareto opti-
mum, i.e. MP =MN , lP = nlN and mP = nmN .
Proposition 2 can be explained in the same way as in Bo¨ringer and Lange
(2005). The introduction of a central planner helps to internalize the negative
externality through GHG emissions. With the uniform proportionality rule
ε, all regions face the same marginal benefits from emissions via allocation
in subsequent periods. Because the basis for allocation, m̂j, can be updated
over time, the central planner has a full control of resources. This holds true
for both a benevolent and a self-interested central planner.
6 Emission permit trade
In this section, I assume that the central planner defines a permit for each
agent’s GHG emissions, but the regions can trade in these permits among
themselves. To enable a stationary state equilibrium in the model, I assume
that the permits for region j are set in fixed proportion to the relative level of
productivity in that region, aγj
/∫ n
0
aγ`d`. When region j has excess permits,
qj > mja
γj
/∫ n
0
aγ`d`, it can sell the difference qj −mjaγj
/∫ n
0
aγ`d` to the
other members of the coalition at the price p. Correspondingly, when region
j has excess GHG emissions, mja
γj
/∫ n
0
aγ`d`− qj, it must buy the difference
mja
γj
/∫ n
0
aγ`d` − qj from other regions at the price p. In equilibrium, the
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price for GHG emission permits, p, adjusts so that the productivity-adjusted
emissions
∫ n
0
mja
γjdj
/∫ n
0
aγ`d` match total permits
∫ n
0
qjdj:∫ n
0
mja
γjdj
/∫ n
0
aγ`d` =
∫ n
0
qjdj. (46)
Region j pays political contributions Rj to the central planner. The or-
der of this common agency game is the following. First, the regions set their
political contributions {Rk} conditional on the central planner’s prospective
policy {qk} .= {qk| k ∈ [0, n]}. Second, the central planners sets the per-
mits {qk} and collect the contributions for its personal consumption. Third,
the regions maximize their utilities given the level of political contributions
({Rk}) and the price for the permits, p. This game is solved in reverse order:
Subsection 6.1 considers regions and 6.2 the political equilibrium.
6.1 The members of the coalition
Region j’s utility starting at time T , (25), can be extended into
Υj
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
[
aγjf(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ + p
(
qj
∫ n
0
aγ`d`−mjaγj
)
+
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
]
e−r(t−T )dt, (47)
where p
(
qj
∫ n
0
aγ`d` −mjaγj
)
is region j’s net income from emission permit
trade. Region j maximizes its utility (47) by GHG and labor input (mj, lj)
subject to Poisson technological change (8) on the assumption that the inter-
est rate r, the permits {qk}, the GHG emission price p, emissions in the rest
of the world, m−j, and political contributions Rk for all k are kept constant.
It is equivalent to maximize∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
]
e−r(t−T )dt
by (lj,mj) subject to (8), given r, {qk}, p, m−j and Rj. The value of the
optimal program for region j can then be defined as follows:
Γj(γj, p,m−j, T )
= max
(mj , lj) s.t. (8)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
]
e−r(t−T )dt. (48)
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I denote Γj = Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) and Γ˜j = Γj(γj + 1, p,m−j, T ). The
Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (48) is
rΓj = max
lj ,mj
Ψj(lj, γj, p,m−j, T ), (49)
where
Ψj(lj, γj, p,m−j, T ) = aγj
[
f(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− pmj
]
+ λ(1− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (50)
This leads to the first-order conditions
∂Ψj
∂mj
= aγj
[
fm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− δf(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ+1
− p
]
= 0, (51)
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
aγjfl(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = 0. (52)
I try the solution that the value of the program, Γj, is in fixed proportion
ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) = ϑjaγj
[
f(l∗j ,m
∗
j)
(m∗j +m−j)δ
− pm∗j
]
,
∂Γj
∂m−j
= −δϑja
γjf(l∗j ,m
∗
j)
(m∗j +m−j)δ+1
,
∂Γj
∂p
= −ϑjaγjm∗j , (53)
where l∗j and m
∗
j are the optimal values of the control variables lj and mj.
This implies
(Γ˜j − Γj)/Γj = a− 1. (54)
Inserting (53) and (54) into the Bellman equation (49) and (50) yields
1/ϑj = r + (1− a)λ(1− lj) > 0. (55)
Given (53), (54) and (55) the first-order conditions (51) and (52) change into
p =
fm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− δf(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ+1
, (56)
1
Γj
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
r + (1− a)λ(1− lj)
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
fl(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− (a− 1)λ = 0. (57)
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In the system (10), (55), (56) and (57), there is perfect symmetry through-
out the members of the coalition j ∈ [0, n]:
lj = l
T , mj = m
T and ϑj = ϑ = [r + (1− a)λ(1− lT )]−1 for j ∈ [0, n]. (58)
Inserting this into (46) yields that a member’s emissions are determined by
the sum of the emission quotas qj as:
mT =
∫ n
0
qjdj. (59)
From (2), (22) and (58) it follows that total emissions are given by
MT = nmT +
∫ N
n
mj(M
T )dj, (60)
where n the number of coalition members, mT a member’s (free rider’s)
emissions and
∫ N
n
mjdj the emissions of the free riders j ∈ (n,N ]. Given
(22), equation (60) defines total emissions MT as the following function of a
member’s emissions mT :
MT (mT ), 0 < (MT )′ =
n
1− ∫ N
n
m′jdj
<
n
1− 1
MT
∫ N
n
mjdj
=
MT
mT
. (61)
Noting (58) and (61), the equilibrium conditions (56) and (57) become
p = [fm(l
T ,mT )MT (mT )− δf(lT ,mT )]MT (mT )−δ−1, (62)
r + (1− a)λ(1− lT )
f(lT ,mT )− pmTMT (mT )δ fl(l
T ,mT ) = (a− 1)λ. (63)
Because labor input lT and the price for the emission permits, p, are unknown
variables, but a member’s emissions mT is a given variable in equations (62)
and (63), one can define the functions
lT (mT ), p(mT ). (64)
The costs of emissions for a member of the coalition can then be defined as
a function of the quantity of emissions as follows:
β(mT )
.
= p(mT )mT . (65)
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6.2 The political equilibrium
Given (10), (48), (58), (59), (61) and (64), region j’s utility (47) is defined
as a function of political contributions {Rk} and emission permits {qk}:
∆j({Rk}, {qk}) = Υj
= Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) +
∫ ∞
T
[
pqj
∫ n
0
aγ`d`+
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
]
e−r(t−T )dt
= Γj
(
γj, p(m
T ),MT (mT )−mT , T)
+
1
r
[
qjp(m
T )
∫ n
0
aγ`d`+
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
]
with mT =
∫ n
0
qjdj.
Given (53), (58), (61) and (65), the sum of these functions has the properties∫ n
0
∆j({Rk}, {qk})dj =
∫ n
0
Γjdj +
1
r
mTp(mT )
∫ n
0
aγ`d`
=
∫ n
0
Γjdj +
1
r
β(mT )
∫ n
0
aγ`d`,
∂
∂qk
∫ n
0
∆j({Rk}, {qk})dj
=
∫ n
0
{
∂Γj
∂m−j
[
(MT )′ − 1]+ ∂Γj
∂p
p′
}
dj +
β′
r
∫ n
0
aγ`d`
=
β′
r
∫ n
0
aγ`d`− ϑ
∫ n
0
{
δf(lT ,mT )
(MT )δ+1
[
(MT )′ − 1]+mTp′}aγjdj
=
{
β′
rϑ
− δf(l
T ,mT )
(MT )δ+1
(
n
1− ∫ N
n
m′jdj
− 1
)
−mTp′
}
ϑ
∫ n
0
aγ`d`
=
{[
1 + (1− a)λ
r
(1− lT )
]
β′ − δf(l
T ,mT )
(MT )δ+1
(
n
1− ∫ N
n
m′jdj
− 1
)
−mTp′
}
ϑ
∫ n
0
aγ`d`
=
{
p+ (1− a)λ
r
(1− lT )β′ − δf(l
T ,mT )
(MT )δ+1
(
n
1− ∫ N
n
m′jdj
− 1
)}
ϑ
∫ n
0
aγ`d`
for k ∈ [0, n]. (66)
The regions j ∈ [0, n] lobby the central planner which decides on the GHG
permits ({qk}). The central planner has its own interests and collects contri-
butions ({Rk}) from the regions. Given this, I specify the central planner’s
18
utility function as follows:
G({Rk}) .= E
∫ ∞
T
∫ n
0
Rje
−r(θ−T )dθ =
1
r
∫ n
0
Rjdj. (67)
Each region j ∈ [0, n] tries to affect the central planner by its contribu-
tions Rj. The contribution schedules are therefore functions of the central
planner’s policy variables, the emission quotas qj:
Rj({qk}), j ∈ [0, n]. (68)
The central planner maximizes its utility function (67) by ({qk}), given the
contribution schedules (68). A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this
game is a set of contribution schedules Rj({qk}) and policy ({qk}) such that
the conditions (i) − (iv) in subsection 5.4 hold, with ε being replaced by
({qk}). Thus, it must be true that ∆j ≥ 0 and
({qk}) ∈ argmax{qk} G
(
R1({qk}), ..., Rn({qk}), n
)
; (69)
({qk}) = argmax{qk} ∆
j
(
Rj({qk}), {qk}
)
, (70)
G
({
Rκ({qk})
}) ≥ max
{qk}
G
({
Rκ({qk})
})∣∣∣
Rj=0
.
The conditions (70) are equivalent to
0 =
∂∆j
∂Rj
∂Rj
∂qk
+
∂∆j
∂qk
= −1
r
∂Rj
∂qk
+
∂∆j
∂qk
for all j and k,
and
∂Rj
∂qk
= r
∂∆j
∂qk
for all j and k, (71)
which suggests that in equilibrium the change in the lobby’s contribution Rj
due to a change in quota mj is equal to the change in the lobby’s rent ∆
j
due to this same fact, holding the contribution Rj constant.
Noting (68), the central planner’s utility function (67) becomes
G({qk}) .= G
({
Rκ({qk})
})
=
1
r
∫ n
0
Rj({qk})dj. (72)
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Noting (66), (71) and (72), the equilibrium conditions (69) are equivalent to
∂G
∂qk
=
1
r
∂
∂qk
∫ n
0
Rjdj =
∂
∂qk
∫ n
0
∆jdj ={
p+ (1− a)λ
r
(1− lT )β′ − δf(l
T ,mT )
(MT )δ+1
(
n
1− ∫ N
n
m′jdj
− 1
)}
ϑ
∫ n
0
aγ`d` = 0.
Thus, noting this, (22) and (64), the emissions permits ({qk}) are chosen so
that the following equation holds true:
p(mT ) = δ
f(lT (mT ),mT )
MT (mT )δ+1
[
n
1− ∫ N
n
m′j
(
MT (mT )
)
dj
− 1
]
+ (a− 1)λ
r
[
1− lT (mT )]β′(mT ) with mT = ∫ n
0
qjdj. (73)
Given (6), (60), (61) and (73), region j’s first-order conditions (62) and
(63) become
ξ
( lT
mT
)
=
mTfm(l
T ,mT )
f(lT ,mT )
=
δmT
MT
+
(MT )δmT
f(lT ,mT )
p
=
(
1−
∫ N
n
m′jdj
)−1
δ
nmT
MT
+ (a− 1)λ
r
(1− lT )β′ (M
T )δmT
f(lT ,mT )
<
(
1−
∫ N
n
m′jdj
)−1
δ
nmT
MT
⇔ mTp′ + p = β′ < 0
⇔ −1 < p
mT
dmT
dp
=
p
mTp′
< 0, (74)
1− ξ
( lT
mT
)
=
lTfl(l
T ,mT )
f(lT ,mT )
=
(a− 1)λlT
r + (1− a)λ(1− lT )
[
1− (M
T )δmT
f(lT ,mT )
p
]
=
(a− 1)λlT
r + (1− a)λ(1− lT )
[
1− ξ
( lT
mT
)
+
δmT
MT
]
.
(75)
6.3 The role of technological change
With λ→ 0, the equations (34) and (61) and the equations (43) and (74)
are the same, correspondingly, but the equations in (44) and (75) must be
ignored, because there is no R&D [cf. (8)]. Thus, non-traded and traded
permits lead to the same outcome. With λ > 0, the outcomes differ and,
noting Proposition 2, a switch from non-traded to traded permits is a Pareto
worsening. These results can be rephrased as follows:
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Proposition 3 If there were no technological change, λ→ 0, then emission
permit trade would not make any difference, lN = lT , mN = mT and ξN = ξT .
With technological change λ > 0, emission permit trade (i.e. a switch from
grandfathering into traded permits) is welfare diminishing.
To prove the next result, assume for a while that
−1 < p
mT
dmT
dp
< 1. (76)
From (44) and (75) it follows that
r + (1− a)λ
(a− 1)λlN =
ξ(lN/mN)
1− ξ(lN/mN) ,
r + (1− a)λ
(a− 1)λlT =
δmT/MT
1− ξ(lT/mT ) .
Given these equations, (74) and (76), one obtains
lT
mT
<
lN
mN
⇔ ξ
( lT
mT
)
< ξ
( lN
mN
)
⇔ l
N
lT
=
r + (1− a)λ
(a− 1)λlT
/
r + (1− a)λ
(a− 1)λlN =
δmT/MT
1− ξ(lT/mT )
/
ξ(lN/mN)
1− ξ(lN/mN)
=
δmT/MT
ξ(lT/mT )
ξ(lT/mT )
1− ξ(lT/mT )
/
ξ(lN/mN)
1− ξ(lN/mN) <
δmT/MT
ξ(lT/mT )
< 1−
∫ N
n
m′jdj < 1,
⇔ lN < lT ⇔ mN < l
N
lT
mT < mT ⇔ zN = 1− lN > 1− lT = zT ,
and the following result:
Proposition 4 Where emissions m are inelastic with respect to the price
for emission permits, p [i.e., where inequality (76) holds], GHG emission
permit trade (i.e. a switch from grandfathering into traded permits) hampers
economic growth (i.e. zT < zN) and aggravates emissions (i.e. mT > mN)
in the coalition. Otherwise [i.e., where (76) does not hold], GHG emission
permit trade speeds up growth and mitigates emissions in the coalition.
Propositions 1 and 4 have the following corollary:
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Proposition 5 Where emissions m are inelastic with respect to the price for
emission permits, p [i.e., where inequality (76) holds], GHG emission permit
trade hampers economic growth (i.e. zj falls for j ∈ (n, 1]) and aggravates
emissions (i.e. mj rises for j ∈ (n, 1]) also in the rest of the world. Other-
wise [i.e., where (76) does not hold], GHG emission permit trade speeds up
economic growth and mitigates emissions also in the rest of the world.
Propositions 3, 4 and 5 can be explained as follows:
The introduction of a central planner for a group of regions, no matter
benevolent or self-interested, as a decision maker for GHG emissions elimi-
nates the externality through GHG emissions, increasing welfare.
Assume that emissions m are inelastic with respect to the price for emis-
sion permits and the central planner switches from grandfathering into emis-
sion permit trade. In that case, a marginal increase in emissions leads to such
a drastic fall in the price for emission permits that the marginal cost of emis-
sions through emission permit trade, β′, is negative [cf., (74)]. This acts as a
subsidy for emissions, increasing these. With a higher input of emissions in
production, more labor is employed in production. This increases wages, dis-
couraging labor-intensive R&D and slowing down economic growth. Without
technological change, all labor is employed in production. In that case, the
distorting effect through the reallocation of labor is missing and the switch
from grandfathering into emission permit trade makes no difference.
7 Conclusions
I examine the design of emission policy in a world with a fixed number of
regions. The regions produce the same good, so that there is no terms-
of-trade effect. Production anywhere in the world incurs GHG emissions
that do not harm locally, but total world-wide emissions decrease welfare
everywhere. Some regions can form an “abatement coalition”, authorizing
a central planner to grant them non-traded or traded GHG permits. The
central planner is self-interested, subject to lobbying, and has no budget of its
own. The crucial point is that the firms improve their productivity through
research and development (R&D). This creates a link between emissions and
economic growth, which affects the optimal design of emission policy. Labor
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and emissions are complementary in production, emissions decrease welfare,
and total factor productivity can be improved by R&D.
Strategic complementarity in emission policy has been explained in the
literature as follows: If the environmental quality is a normal good, an in-
crease in the free riders’ real income due to better terms of trade decreases
emissions (e.g. Copeland and Taylor 2005). When technology is allowed
to adjust endogenously, induced technological change leads to a reduction
emissions among free riders as well (e.g. Di Maria and Van der Werf 2008).
When improvements in abatement technology generated by the emission con-
straint inside the coalition spill over to free riders, emissions in the latter fall
(Golombek and Hoel 2004; Gerlach and Kuik 2007). As an alternative to
these explanations, I complementary a complementary effect as follows: If
the rest of the world cuts their emissions down, then the marginal disutility
of total emissions in any region increases, encouraging that region to reduce
its emissions. Because labor and emissions are complementary in produc-
tion, labor input in production falls. This decreases the wage and promotes
labor-intensive R&D. With a higher level of R&D, economic growth is faster.
The introduction of a central planner into the “abatement coalition” helps
to internalize the negative externality through GHG emissions. With grand-
fathering, all regions face the same marginal benefits from emissions via allo-
cation in subsequent periods. Because the basis for allocation can be updated
over time, the central planner has a full control of resources and the outcome
is Pareto optimal. This holds true for both a benevolent and a self-interested
central planner. With GHG emission permit trade, some of decision making
is transferred to the level of regions, without leaving adequate instruments
for the central planner. This distorts the allocation of resources, decreasing
economic welfare from the position of grandfathering.
It is also shown that where emissions are inelastic with respect to the
price for emission permits in the coalition, a switch from grandfathering into
emission permit trade aggravates emissions and hampers economic growth.
In that case, a marginal increase in emissions leads to such a drastic fall in
the price for emission permits that the marginal cost of emissions through
emission permit trade is negative. This acts as a subsidy for emissions,
increasing these. With a higher input of emissions in production, more labor
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is employed in production. This increases wages, discouraging labor-intensive
R&D and slowing down economic growth. Without technological change, all
labor is employed in production. In that case, the distorting effect through
the reallocation of labor is missing and the switch from grandfathering into
emission permit trade makes no difference.
Appendix
The equations (20) and (21) can be transformed into
log ξ(lj/mj) + logM − logmj = constants,
log lj −
[
ξj(lj/mj)
−1 − δj
]
= constants.
Differentiating this system totally yield ξ′jmj − ljmj ξ′jmj − 1mj
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1−δjξj)mj −
(ξ′j/ξj)lj
(1−δjξj)(mj)2
( dlj
dmj
)
+
(
1
M
0
)
dM = 0.
This implies
dmj
dM
=
1
M
∫ N
n
mj
[
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1− δjξj)mj
][
ξ′j
mj︸︷︷︸
+
+
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1− δjξj)mj
]−1
dj
<
1
M
∫ N
n
mjdj < 1,
∂lj
∂M
=
1
Jj
1
M
(ξ′j/ξj)lj
(1− δjξj)(mj)2 > 0, (77)
where
Jj =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξ′j
mj
− lj
mj
ξ′j
mj
− 1
mj
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1−δjξj)mj −
(ξ′j/ξj)lj
(1−δjξj)(mj)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1mj
[
ξ′j
mj
+
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1− δjξj)mj
]
> 0.
From (1) and (77) it follows that dzj/dM = −dlj/dM < 0.
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